

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 05640 071036Z

12

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

----- 090997

O 071010Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4400

INFO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T CAIRO 5640

EXDIS

EO 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR EG LY

SUBJECT: US-LIBYAN RELATIONS

REF: STATE 130498

1. SINCE PRESIDENT SADAT IS SCHEDULED PROCEED DIRECTLY FROM SUEZ TO ALEXANDRIA, WHERE HE WILL REMAIN FOR THE SUMMER, I DISCUSSED REFERENCED SUBJECT WITH FAHMY. I TOLD HIM OF OUR INTENTION TO ACCEPT KHALIFA AS LIBYAN AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON AND TO NEGOTIATE A NEW AND HIGHER CEILING ON LIBYAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN WASHINGTON WITH THE LIBYAN GOVT. THESE STEPS, I POINTED OUT, WILL NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL AFTER COMPLETION OF OUR MIDDLE EAST POLICY REASSESSMENT. I ASKED FAHMY TO ADVISE THE PRESIDENT OF THE ABOVE, ADDING WE WOULD WELCOME ANY COMMENTS SADAT MIGHT HAVE.

2. FAHMY ASKED ABOUT THE BACKGROUND OF THIS DEVELOPMENT. I THEREFORE TOLD HIM ABOUT THE LIBYAN NOTE OF APRIL 14 REQUESTING AGREEMENT FOR KHALIFA AS AMBASSADOR TO THE US AND THE APRIL 15 ACTION BY THE LIBYAN GOVT LIFTING THE CEILING ON US EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN LIBYA. I POINTED OUT THAT THE ABSENCE OF AMBASSADORS IN THE RESPECTIVE CAPITALS WAS NOT THE RESULT OF A DECISION OF EITHER GOVERNMENT TO EXPELL OR NOT TO ACCEPT AN AMBASSADOR FROM THE OTHER, BUT CAME ABOUT AS A RESULT OF OUR DECISION NOT TO REPLACE AMBASSADOR PALMER AT THE TIME OF HIS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 05640 071036Z

DEPARTURE AT THE END OF HIS TOUR BECAUSE THE LIBYAN

GOVT HAD NOT RECEIVED HIM AT APPROPRIATE LEVELS AND THERE HAD BEEN NO MEANINGFUL CONTACT. LIBYANS HAD REACTED BY NOT SENDING AN AMBASSADOR OF THEIR OWN. THE ACCEPTANCE OF A LIBYAN AMBASSADOR REPRESENTS NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN USG POLICY AND MIGHT BE A STEP TOWARD A BETTER DIALOGUE BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. LIFTING THE CEILING OF THE LIBYAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON ENABLES THE LATTER TO TAKE CARE OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF LIBYAN STUDENTS IN THE US.

3. FAHMY'S REACTION WAS MIXED. HE VIEWED THE LIBYAN INITIATIVE AS AN EFFORT TO BALANCE THEIR RECENT ARMS AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS. EVEN THOUGH THE LIBYAN ACTIONS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN APRIL, HE BELIEVED LIBYAN-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS WERE BY THEN ALREADY UNDERWAY. WHILE THIS IS DESIRABLE IN PRINCIPLE, FAHMY EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT SUCH ACTION ON OUR PART, COMING NOW, WILL BE VIEWED IN ARAB WORLD AS US ENDORSEMENT OF LIBYA'S RECENT MASSIVE ARMS DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS. FAHMY EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE USG SEEMS TO MINIMIZE THE LIBYAN-SOVIET ARMS DEAL AND FAILS TO SEE IT AS A DIRECT THREAT TO EGYPT. (I KNOW THAT SADAT MADE SAME POINT TO VISITING SAUDI MODA PRINCE SULTAN A FEW DAYS AGO.) APART FROM THIS ASPECT, FAHMY NOTED QADHAAFI'S RECENT ATTACKS ON SADAT FOR ATTENDING THE SALZBURG SUMMIT AND REOPENING THE SUEZ CANAL HAVE BECOME SHRILLER AND HAVE FORCED SADAT TO RESPOND. THUS, THE SADAT-QADHAAFI BATTLE OF WORDS IS AGIN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. ACTIONS SUCH AS WE CONTEMPLATE, IF THEY COME NOW, WILL BE VIEWED IN EGYPT AND IN THE ARAB WORLD AS A SLAP AT SADAT OR AT THE VERY LEAST INDIFFERENCE TO HIS POSITION. THEY WOULD SCARCELY SEEM TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE FREQUENTLY STATED US POLICY OF CONSIDERING SADAT AS THE KEY ARAB LEADER AND WORKING TO STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION. FAHMY STATED HIS COMMENTS REPRESENTED HIS PERSONAL REACTION AND UNDERTOOK TO LET US HAVE ANY COMMENTS THE PRESIDENT MIGHT HAVE.

4. SHORTLY AFTER ABOVE CONVERSATION, FAHMY CALLED TO SAY HE HAD DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH SADAT AND PRESIDENT'S REACTION IS DISTINCTLY NEGATIVE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 05640 071036Z

FOR US TO TAKE PROPOSED ACTION NOW WOULD VITIATE POSITIVE REACTION OF SALZBURG SUMMIT. THEY WOULD BE VIEWED IN EGYPT AND THE ARAB WORLD AS A SLAP AT SADAT AND A LACK OF US CONCERN ABOUT QADHAAFI'S SCURRILOUS ATTACKS AGAINST SADAT AND HIS SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN EGYPT. WHILE THE DECISION MUST BE MADE BY USG, SADAT EMPHATICALLY URGED THAT ANY SUCH STEPS BE POSTPONED FOR TIME BEING.

EILTS

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, AMBASSADORS, MILITARY SALES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 JUN 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975CAIRO05640
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750199-1071
From: CAIRO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750669/aaaaclhr.tel
Line Count: 116
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 75 STATE 130498
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <09 APR 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <22 SEP 2003 by CunninFX>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: US-LIBYAN RELATIONS
TAGS: PFOR, EG, LY, UR, (SADAT, ANWAR), (FAHMY, ISMAIL)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006